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Truth-Makers and the “Grounding 
Objection” to Molinism 
 
Tyler Crown 
 
I. Introduction 
One of the most discussed topics on the nature of God, in Christian circles 
today, is the subject of God’s knowledge. There are a few popular positions today 
that are engaged in a serious debate as to which view most accurately supports the 
biblical and philosophical understanding of the nature of God’s knowledge. One 
such position, which has become increasingly popular and has found support 
among many leading Christian philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga, Thomas 
Flint and William Lane Craig, is called Molinism.1 While Molinism does have an 
abundance of supporters, there are many detractors as well. Calvinist’s, Thomists 
and open theists have been waging a war against Molinism for many years.2 An 
objection that has been brought against Molinism by these detractors, which is 
considered by John D. Laing, author of the article “Middle Knowledge,” to be the 
most popular objection, is called the “grounding objection.”3 In this paper, I will 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty, (Erscheinungsort Nicht Ermittelbar: B & 
H Publishing Group, 2014), 6. 
 
2 Kenneth J. Perszyk, "Recent Work on Molinism," Philosophy Compass 8, no. 8 (2013): 
762-63, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phc3.12057 
 
3 John D. Laing, "Middle Knowledge," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 
March 29, 2018, http://www.iep.utm.edu/middlekn/#SSH3b.iv. 
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argue that the so-called “grounding objection” fails to defeat Molinism because it 
is based on a theory of the connection of truth and reality, called truth-maker 
theory, which is controversial. I will also show how, even if one were to accept 
truth-maker theory, one could still avoid the objection. 
II. Background Information 
Before I begin to discuss the grounding objection and the arguments 
defending Molinism against it, I think it is important to give some background 
information for the Molinist position. Molinism was originally conceived during 
the Counter-Reformation by the sixteenth century Spanish Jesuit theologian and 
philosopher Luis de Molina (1535-1600) as a response to the positions of the 
reformers, like Martin Luther and John Calvin, who denied creaturely freedom.4 
Support for the Molinist position abated for a while, but was revived by Alvin 
Plantinga when he proposed his free will defense against the problem of evil.5 
Ever since then, Molinism has seen a resurgence in interest and has become a 
more prominent viewpoint among modern theologians and scholars. The basic 
idea behind Molinism is stated well by Alexander Zambrano in his article 
“Truthmaker and the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge,” where he says, 
“The crux of the Molinist account is that God has middle knowledge: that is, 
                                                 
4 Kenneth J. Perszyk, "Introduction," In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. 
Kenneth J. Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-3. 
 
5 Ibid., 6.  
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logically prior to the actual world, God knows true counterfactuals of freedom, 
propositions describing what every logically possible person would freely do in 
every logically possible situation God could place her in.”6  
One aspect of Molinism that should be stated is its strict adherence to 
Libertarian freedom. However, it also upholds a strong view of God’s providence. 
The overall goal of Molinism is to allow one to accept that God can be sovereign 
over His creation without accepting causal determinism. Molinism seeks to 
achieve this through God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
(hereafter referred to as CCFs), i.e. what every logically possible person would 
freely do in every logically possible situation God could place that person in. The 
reason why, according to the Molinist, CCFs would work is, if God can know all 
logically possible decisions and outcomes of free creatures, then He can, logically 
prior to His creative act, determine which combination of free creatures, placed in 
specific time periods, would lead to the fulfillment of His ultimate will. Because 
God is merely instantiating a person, knowing what that person is going to do in 
the specific place that person is instantiated, while at the same time not 
determining that person’s actions, He is able to plan out the world according to 
His will, while also keeping intact the freedom of these instantiated persons. 
                                                 
6 Alexander Zambrano, "Truthmaker and the Grounding Objection to Middle 
Knowledge," Aporia 21, no. 2 (2011): 19, http://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/zambrano-
truthmaker_and_the_grounding_objection_to_middle_knowledge.pdf. 
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III. Reasons for Accepting Molinism 
Why do scholars like Craig and Plantinga accept Molinism? One reason why 
this view seems to be viable is that we, as finite human beings, appear to have the 
ability to know the truth values of some CCFs.7 For instance, it seems reasonable 
for me to say that the following proposition is true: If I had been sick with the 
stomach flu on Sunday, April 1, 2018, I would have chosen not to attend the 11 
o’clock Easter service at my church. Furthermore, it also seems reasonable for me 
to say that the proposition If Michael Jackson had his larynx removed when he 
was 26, then he would have chosen to continue his singing career is false. 
However, regardless of whether these propositions are true or false, it seems 
reasonable to give them a truth value. These examples appear to show that I can 
have knowledge of the truth value of events that have not, nor ever will transpire. 
So why could not God have this knowledge?  
Another reason in favor of the Molinist account is that there appear to be 
passages in the Bible that portray God as knowing CCFs. Take, for example, 
Matthew 11:23 where Jesus says, “And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted to the 
heavens? No, you will go down to Hades. For if the miracles that were performed 
in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.” Or 
                                                 
7 William Lane Craig, "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the ‘Grounding 
Objection,’" Reasonable Faith, accessed March 15, 2018, 
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/divine-omniscience/middle-
knowledge-truth-makers-and-the-grounding-objection/.  
Crown 5 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2018     Volume 4     Issue 1 
 
take the famous example of Saul and David in 1 Samuel 23:7-13, where David is 
staying in Keilah after defeating the Philistines. He hears rumors that Saul is on 
his way to besiege the city to try to kill or capture him, so he asks God if Saul will 
in fact do this and if he does, whether the people of Keilah will give him over to 
Saul. God answers in the affirmative for both questions, leading David to flee the 
city. Here is where this example gets interesting. Neither of these events ever take 
place, i.e. Saul besieging the city and the people giving David up to Saul. 
However, God still knew that these events would take place if the original 
circumstances had been maintained, i.e. David had stayed in Keilah. Both biblical 
passages demonstrate that God knows something about the free choices of human 
beings that never transpire but could have transpired, given the proper set of 
circumstances. In other words, according to scripture, God appears to know some 
CCFs. 
IV. The Grounding Objection to Molinism 
Now that I have given some background information for Molinism and a few 
of the reasons why it has been considered a viable position by some philosophers 
and theologians, what exactly is the grounding objection to Molinism?8 There are 
a few ways of stating this objection, however the following statement will suffice 
to get the main point of the objection across. In short, the grounding objection 
                                                 
8 I have in mind scholars like William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint and 
Kenneth Keathley, among a host of others.  
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states “that there are or can be no contingently true counterfactuals of freedom 
because there is nothing in reality that ‘grounds’ their truth or ‘makes’ them true 
(in contemporary parlance, they have no ‘truth-makers’).”9 A truth-maker is 
something like an object or state of affairs that exists in the real world. So, a 
counterfactual of creaturely freedom cannot be true because there is no state of 
affairs or object to which the counterfactual refers. Consider the example of Saul 
and David. In this example, there is a given CCF, namely that if David were to 
stay in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city and the people of Keilah would freely 
choose to give David over to Saul. However, what gives this proposition a truth 
value? David did not stay in Keilah, so there is no state of affairs to ground the 
given proposition. Furthermore, there is no object, namely a David that would 
stay in Keilah, to ground the truth value of this proposition because there is not an 
object, a David, that ever stayed in Keilah in the given circumstance. 
Traditionally, God is said to know all things that will actually be the case. So, 
the reason why God knew that David would leave Keilah is that David did in fact 
leave Keilah. However, according to the grounding objection, there is neither a 
state of affairs nor an object to ground the truth value of the given CCF about the 
people of Keilah and Saul.  
                                                 
9 Perszyk, "Introduction," 7. 
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There have been those who have thought that maybe CCFs could be grounded 
in the will of God, but this is problematic for the libertarian because, by 
grounding CCFs in the will of God, one is suggesting CCFs are determined by 
God.10 So, this cannot be a possibility for the grounding of CCFs either, at least 
not if one wishes to maintain libertarian freedom. 
One of the primary opponents of Molinism, as well as one of the main 
proponents of the grounding objection, is William Hasker. In his article “The 
(Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals” Hasker formulates a grounding 
principle in order to argue against the truth value of Molinist counterfactuals.11   
His formulation goes as follows: 
(GP) Any true contingent proposition is true in virtue of the 
existence or non-existence of some concrete object.12 
 
Hasker clarifies that the notion of existence, in this principle, is to be taken 
trans-temporally, i.e. that if a thing exists, it exists now, in the past and/or in the 
future.13 So, another way one could reformulate this principle, as Thomas Flint 
does, is as follows: 
                                                 
10 Perszyk, "Recent Work on Molinism," 758. 
 
11 William Hasker, "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals," in Molinism: The  
Contemporary Debate, ed. Kenneth J. Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27-29. 
 
12 Ibid., 27.  
 
13 Ibid.  
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(GP`) Any true contingent proposition is true in virtue of some 
concrete state of affairs that does exist, or has existed, or will 
exist.14 
Given this version of the grounding principle, propositions about states of 
affairs that have, do or will exist are grounded because they have something 
concrete to which the propositions actually refer. However, this leaves CCFs 
again ungrounded because they have no such concrete states of affairs.  
V. Truth-Maker Theory and the Grounding of Objection 
Having explained the overall grounding objection to Molinism, is it true that 
Molinist counterfactuals have no grounding? William Lane Craig in his article 
“Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the “Grounding Objection,” notes that 
the grounding objection presupposes a view of the relation of truth and reality, 
called Truth-Maker Theory (TMT). 15 TMT posits that, for a proposition to have a 
truth-value (to be a truth-bearer) there must be some entity that makes that 
proposition true or false (a truth-maker). This seems to be a rather acceptable 
presupposition. How can a proposition be true if it does not have something that it 
refers to, which makes it true, i.e. a real state of affairs or object?  
However, Craig identifies some propositions that would not fit this principle; 
categories that we naturally assume contain a truth value. For instance, negative 
existential propositions would not fit TMT as truth bearers. Take for example the 
                                                 
14 Hasker, "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals," 27.  
 
15 Craig, "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection.’”  
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proposition Frodo Baggins does not exist which we would consider true. To 
clarify, by the non-existence of Frodo Baggins, I am referring to the idea that 
there is no ontologically existing state of affairs or object that gives the character 
in J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings series named Frodo Baggins ontological 
existence. Obviously, Frodo Baggins is real in some sense by virtue of being a 
character in a book, however he has no true ontological existence. So, in the given 
example, there is no concrete entity that the statement refers to. Therefore, it is 
neither true nor false that Frodo Baggins does not exist. This can be applied to any 
negative existential proposition, such as Zeus does not exist, or The tooth fairy 
does not exist. These are propositions that we typically consider to be true. 
However, according to TMT they have no truth value because they have no truth-
maker. 
Another set of statements that would not be considered as carrying truth 
values, according to TMT, are past and future tense statements about persons who 
no longer exist or have not yet come into existence. Take, for example, a 
proposition like Socrates was sentenced to death by poisoning. Socrates no longer 
exists (at least according to the dynamic theory of time) and therefore statements 
related to him bear no truth. For there is now no existing object or state of affairs 
related to Socrates that would ground the statement. An example of a future-tense 
proposition such as The governor of Virginia in the year 2100 will be a Latino 
does not bear a truth value either, because there is no currently existing object or 
Crown 10 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2018     Volume 4     Issue 1 
 
state of affairs to ground the statement. Another example that better shows the 
inadequacy of this view is a proposition like I will go home for the summer 
compared to a proposition like I am going home for the summer. Because there is 
no present state of affairs to ground the proposition I will go home for the summer 
there is no truth-value in the proposition. Now, one might assert that there will be 
a truth-maker at the time that the proposition refers to, namely that I do go home 
for summer.16 However, this would not make the proposition, I will go home for 
the summer, true. Instead, it will make the proposition, I am going home for the 
summer true. In agreement with this idea, Craig states:  
Some assert that past– and future–tensed statements literally 
have (present–tense) no truth–makers, although they either did 
or will. This suggestion is problematic, however, because when 
the truth–maker of, say, a future–tense sentence like "Bush will 
be inaugurated as our forty–second President" becomes present, 
then that statement, far from being true, is false, and the 
corresponding present–tense statement, "Bush is being 
inaugurated as our forty–second President" is or becomes true.17 
The conclusion that future-tense statements are never true seems to be absurd, 
but it is what logically follows if one accepts TMT.  
It appears as though TMT has some issues of its own to work out. In addition 
to the problem outlined above, according to Craig, TMT has suffered greatly 
                                                 
16 Steven B. Cowan, "The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge 
Revisited," Religious Studies 39, no. 1 (2003): 96-97. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008449. 
 
17 Craig, "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the "Grounding Objection." 
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because it has not been articulated in depth by any of its advocates.18 
Furthermore, it has primarily been presupposed by those who accept it but has not 
been defended in any meaningful way as of now. However, even if TMT had a 
more robust defense there are still ways to reconcile Molinist CCFs with TMT. 
VI. Reconciling Molinist CCFs with TMT 
One proposal that attempts to reconcile Molinism’s need for CCFs and TMT 
suggest that the grounds for the truth value of CCFs are the essences of 
individuals that exist in the pre-creative mind of God.19 In other words, God has a 
concept of all possible beings, logically prior to the creative act, and from those 
concepts He chooses which ones to actualize into beings, which would thereby 
allow him to plan out the best possible world that would at the same time match 
up to His overall will for creation.20 This view seems reasonable. For to deny the 
claim that God knows essences of beings logically prior to the creative act would 
force one to deny God’s ability to have knowledge of the actual world logically 
prior to the creative act. For, according to TMT, there would be no grounding 
object or state of affairs that exists logically prior to the creative act to ground 
such propositions, even if the propositions will, following the creative act, have a 
                                                 
18 Craig, "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the "Grounding Objection." 
 
19 Laing, "Middle Knowledge." 
 
20 Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty, 39-40; Perszyk, "Recent Work on Molinism," 
758-759. 
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truth-maker. If someone posits that God knows those whom He created logically 
prior to creating them, then they must assert a similar if not identical position as 
the Molinst.  
A second reconciliation option is to take a position that those whom God has 
“created” have always existed in some way, even logically prior to the creative 
act. However, while I doubt any Molinist, let alone any orthodox Christian, would 
want to assert such a claim, the Molinist could just as easily assert either one of 
these positions for CCFs.  
A third possibility would be to deny God’s omniscience altogether, which is 
the least desirable outcome for most Christians. So, it seems reasonable to assert 
the claim that there are an infinite number of possible beings, each with their own 
essence, the essence of which God knows logically prior to the creative act, 
thereby grounding the truth value of CCFs. This response would also correspond 
nicely to Hasker’s grounding principle, in that it would allow the Molinist to 
make a revision to it. The revision would look something like this: 
(GP+) Any true contingent proposition is true in virtue of some 
concrete state of affairs that does exist, or has existed, or will 
exist, or would exist (under specified conditions).21 
This principle would work because if one denies the grounding for CCFs on the 
basis of TMT, then one would also have to deny that there is grounding for past 
                                                 
21 Thomas P. Flint, "Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker," 
in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Kenneth J. Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 39. 
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and future contingent propositions. However, it does not seem at all desirable to 
adhere to such a principle. Therefore, it seems as though the Molinist has found a 
way of reconciling TMT with CCFs. 
VII. Objections to Reconciling TMT with Molinism 
While there are some who believe that grounding is necessary for CCFs, there 
are also those who deny this claim. One of the primary deniers of the claim that 
CCFs require truth-makers is Trenton Merricks. The main reason why he denies 
the claim goes back to examples, primarily negative existential statements, that 
seem to have a truth value, yet lack a truth-maker. His main example is the 
proposition There are no white ravens.22 He states that this proposition is true, but 
that the statement has nothing to ground it. Alternatively, he argues that the truth 
of the proposition depends not on there being a specific concrete object to ground 
the truth value of the proposition, but rather it depends on the way the world is, 
“That there are no white ravens is true. It is true because of how the world is. 
Specifically, it is true because there are no white ravens.”23 While it may sound as 
though Merricks is giving a truth-maker, namely a state of affairs of the world, as 
grounding for this proposition, this is not the case, as he further states,  
That truth depends on the world is not the thesis that, for each 
truth, there is something in the world to which that truth 
“corresponds.” Nor is it the thesis that every truth has a 
                                                 
22 Trenton Merricks, "Truth and Molinism," in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. 
Kenneth J. Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 62. 
 
23 Ibid., 68.  
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“truthmaker.” Nor is it even the thesis that there is a depends on 
or a because relation that holds between each truth and (some 
part of) the world.24 
Relating this back to the example of the white ravens he states, 
…it is a matter of controversy whether there is some entity—
such as the state of affairs of the universe’s lacking white 
ravens—to which that truth corresponds. Likewise, it is 
controversial whether that truth has a truthmaker. Similarly, it is 
controversial whether that truth stands in a depends on or a 
because relation to some relatum, a relatum like (again) the state 
of affairs of the universe’s lacking white ravens. But even so, it 
should not be at all controversial that that there are no white 
ravens is true because there are no white ravens.25 
So, how does this relate to CCFs? Merricks continues by giving an example of 
a CCF: 
(1) If S were in C, S would freely do A.26 
He then continues, saying:  
Counterfactual (1) is true because of how the world is. In 
particular, (1) is true because if S were in C, S would freely do 
A. This is how things are even if—as we are now supposing—
(1) is unfulfilled. Of course, Molinists believe that there are 
many other true counterfactuals of freedom. The truth of each of 
these counterfactuals, like the truth of (1), depends on the 
world.27 
 
                                                 
24 Merricks, "Truth and Molinism," 62. 
  
25 Ibid.   
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Ibid. 
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 Now, Merricks argument is not new to himself. This line of argument is a 
formulation of a brute fact argument, and in its basic form it argues that, given a 
specific state of affairs, it is just true that the given proposition is correct.28 While 
this may seem like a simplistic response, it is one that is quite popular; having 
proponents in respected philosophers like Alvin Plantinga and Thomas Flint. 
VIII. Some Final Thoughts 
Before I conclude, there is one final point that needs to be made, which is 
stated nicely by Craig. Craig argues that it is not required that the Molinist give 
the actual way that God foreknows CCFs, but rather merely a possible way that 
God foreknows CCFs. For, as Craig states, “Who are human beings that they 
should know how God foreknows the future?”29 Whether one wants to identify 
pre-existent essences in the mind of God as the grounding for counterfactuals, or 
to follow Merricks lead and claim that CCFs are just brute facts based on how the 
world is, it is clear there are variety of ways God could know CCFs, each of 
which is compatible with Molinism. Furthermore, the burden of proof does not lie 
with the Molinist to prove the existence of CCFs. As Craig states, “For that 
assumption is simply one of the postulates of the theory, which must be assessed 
                                                 
28 Cowan, 98-99. 
 
29 Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty, 40. 
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as a whole in terms of typical criteria of theory assessment.”30 As a defense for 
this position, Craig uses Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. In this theory, 
Einstein assumed the so-called Light Postulate, which asserts that light travels in 
vacuo at a constant speed.31 Now, there is no data to support this claim, however, 
as Craig asserts, this theory is widely accepted because of its overall coherence. 
This, Craig believes, is how Molinism should be treated. 
IX. Conclusion 
While there are aspects of Molinism that still require further defense and 
argumentation, I do not think that the grounding objection has a strong claim 
against Molinism. As I have discussed in this paper, there are a few different 
directions one can go to ground CCFs. Furthermore, I have given a credible 
argument from Merricks for why CCFs do not need to be grounded at all. So, in 
agreement with many Molinist scholars, it would seem that this objection has 
been successfully answered, at least in a way that can provide the Molinist with a 
response that shifts the burden of proof to the critic of Molinism.32 
 In this paper, I have argued that the so-called “grounding objection” fails to 
defeat Molinism because it is based on a theory of the connection of truth and 
                                                 
30 William Lane Craig, "Ducking Friendly Fire: Davison on the Grounding Objection," 
Reasonable Faith, accessed March 31, 2018, https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-
writings/divine-omniscience/ducking-friendly-fire-davison-on-the-grounding-objection/. 
 
31 Ibid.  
 
32 Perszyk, "Introduction," 8. 
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reality, called truth-maker theory, which is very controversial. I have also shown 
how, even if one were to accept truth-maker theory, one could avoid the 
grounding objection. 
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